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Abstract: Devolution of taxes to sub-national jurisdictions could reduce expected tax revenue 
if some households move to lower tax regimes, constraining devolved government policy. This 
paper develops an indirect approach to establishing lower bound revenue impacts of possible 
devolved tax changes by allowing for tax-induced migration. The results suggest that limited 
tax devolution, such as conferred on Wales by the U.K. 2014 Act, could trigger substantial tax 
revenue and GVA spill-overs from migration on the devolved economy. The prospect may 
have, and perhaps should have, discouraged decentralisation of taxation to the same extent as 
decentralisation of spending in the OECD.  
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1. Introduction 
Households may migrate between jurisdictions to secure preferred mixes of collectively sup-
plied services and taxation (Tiebout, 1956; Fox et al, 1989; Day, 1992; Nelson, 2008). Either 
because of such migration or because of intrinsic, spatially diverse preferences, devolution or 
decentralisation of public spending to lower tier governments may therefore allow a better sat-
isfaction of needs (Oates, 1972). Yet there is evidence that decentralising both public spending 
and tax revenues lowers economic growth in OECD countries1 (Rodríguez-Pose et al, 2009; 
Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2011) and in China (Zhang and Zou, 1998). Income disparity 
also seems to be sensitive to fiscal devolution (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010). The pro-
cesses involved may include agency problems, weaker governance structures, a reduction in 
the equalising role formerly exercised by central government and adverse effects of territorial 
competition (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2005). 
An aspect of territorial competition, tax-induced migration, may be an especially significant 
contributor. If devolved or decentralised taxation adversely affected tax revenues because 
households moved to avoid tax, then devolved public spending and redistributive policies could 
be severely constrained (Xu and Warner, 2016)2. This might be why, despite an increase in the 
sub-national government share of public spending in a majority of OECD countries, there has 
been no corresponding rise in devolved tax revenues (Journard and Kongsrud, 2003). Although 
in Switzerland little migration is induced by tax policies, because of the feedback through the 
housing market (Liebig and Sousa-Poza, 2006; Liebig, Puhani and Sousa-Poza, 2007), a study 
of Denmark’s ‘tax stealing’ (Kleven et al, 2014) shows that induced migration of higher rate 
income (foreign) taxpayers can be important. This last finding is confirmed for interstate mo-
bility of highly paid scientists within the U.S. (Moretti and Wilson, 2017) but much less so for 
the highest earners in total (Young et al, 2016). The highest earners in Spain are responsive to 
regional tax differentials but not sufficiently to entirely offset the revenue raising impact of tax 
increases (Agrawal and Foremny, 2018). 
How problematic tax differentials are for devolved regimes depends on the mobility of the tax 
base and the nature and extent of central funding. The least mobile tax base is land and therefore 
a property tax is suitable for decentralised jurisdictions, as Yilmazkuday (2016) finds for U.S. 
states. In the United Kingdom (U.K.) in the form of ‘council tax’ this has been the favoured 
means of devolved financing for Local Authorities (LAs), of which there are 348 in England 
and Wales. In the absence of legal restrictions on movement, capital taxes are at the other end 
                                                          
1 Though Spain appears to be an exception (Gil-Serrate, Lopez-Laborda and Mur, 2011). 
2 The sensitivity of tax yields to tax rates has generally focussed on the induced changes in the supply of effort 
(Meghir and Phillips, 2008; Saez et al, 2012). 
of the base mobility spectrum. Highly mobile capital drives the Hatfield (2015) model of fiscal 
decentralisation and economic growth.  
From a comprehensive survey of Tiebout model-inspired approaches to fiscal devolution, Bo-
adway and Tremblay (2012) concluded that the unrealistic assumption of perfect labour mo-
bility is a major drawback. But for devolved taxes on labour, or on sales, any substantial labour 
mobility is a potential problem for tax revenue. Wealthier persons paying the greater jurisdic-
tion-specific taxes are likely to be the most prone to movement; they have more tax payments 
to avoid by relocation. This probably accounts for Yilmazkuday’s (2017) result that any in-
crease in US state dividend-income tax reduces revenues, whereas tax revenues are boosted by 
higher wage-income, sales or property taxes.  
In the U.K. before 1997 the only decentralised source of fiscal revenue was LA property taxes, 
covering about 25 percent of their spending. Since 1997 three much larger devolved spending 
administrations have been created, Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland, responsible for one 
sixth of the U.K. population. Limited decentralisation of taxes followed, of which a portion of 
the income tax rate, was the most important. The Scottish government reduced the lower tax 
rate and increased the higher rates in 2018. To examine the effects of future devolved income 
tax policies, this paper develops a generic method applied to the Welsh case3. The present paper 
estimates the revenue and GVA consequences of the exercise of fiscal autonomy in this in-
stance of fiscal devolution. 
At the centre of the approach is a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model of the de-
volved jurisdiction. Because the possibility of tax-induced migration might be critical to de-
centralised tax policy, the CGE model is supplemented with an econometric exercise. With no 
other U.K. experience of spatial variations in tax rates before 2018, LA property taxes are uti-
lised to gauge future U.K. devolved government income tax-induced migration. Estimates of 
the tax revenue consequences for the devolved Welsh administration are obtained from the 
CGE model. Because existing (here, property) taxes have different bases from proposed de-
volved (here, income) taxes, appropriate corrections are made in the decentralised economy 
model. This model also establishes how the tax base and therefore the other economic variables 
of the devolved economy would be changed by implementing different tax rates, given the 
migration responses estimated. The approach can therefore contribute to evaluating the desir-
ability of types of tax devolution before they have been implemented. 
An advantage of this modelling process is that more accurate estimates of the effects of tax on 
migration can be obtained than if migration was estimated simply as part of the CGE model 
                                                          
3 An Act of 2014 (modified in 2017) conferred on the Welsh government additional tax powers. 
(compare Gillespie et al (2001) and Rutherford and Torma (2010))4. This is because CGE mod-
els require empirically acceptable equation specifications and plausible ranges of parameter 
values which are not available in this, and many, devolution cases. 
Simulation shows partial tax devolution permits a divergence of total tax generated as a conse-
quence of devolved tax policy and tax receipts allowed to the devolved government. Fuller tax 
devolution, however, leaves the jurisdiction open to adverse asymmetric shocks. That some tax 
revenue to finance decentralised spending should be raised locally to give an incentive for ef-
ficient government resource allocation may be a sound principle (Sanguinetti and Tommasi, 
2004). But the spill-over effects from induced migration could be a reason why taxes have been 
decentralised less than spending, as Journard and Kongsrud (2003) noted for the OECD, and 
perhaps why this is desirable.  
The following section discusses the research questions and the method, section 3 outlines the 
CGE devolved economy model, the next section presents the estimated migration model with 
the tax coefficients, section 5 shows the migration implied by tax differentials and in section 6 
there is a simulation of the tax differential full effects in the devolved economy model. 
2. Some Spatial Consequences of Fiscal Devolution 
Focussing on the devolved economy of Wales, the main research questions are: 
What would be the effects on migration of divergences between the income tax rates in 
Wales and England and how would devolved tax revenue be affected? 
These questions could more easily be answered with historical data of different income tax 
rates in Wales and England. However, because such differential rates have never been created5, 
the questions are addressed by two research sub-questions. 
Within-U.K. migration data is used to estimate the effects of property (council) tax differences 
on gross migration between pairs of LA jurisdictions (a complete list of data sources is provided 
in Appendix A). After appropriate aggregation, this provides an answer to the first research 
sub-question: 
(R1) What are the effects of property tax differentials on the net migration flow into 
Wales? 
                                                          
4 Both these papers simply have net migration as a linear function of relative GDP or wages and relative unem-
ployment rates. 
5 This is why Foreman-Peck and Lungu’s (2009) simulation of an income tax change in the Welsh economy 
only shows the effect conditional on an identical tax change in the rest of the U.K. economy. 
But income taxes have different bases from property taxes. It is essential to establish the rela-
tionship between the effects of property tax and income tax. Hence, the second research sub-
question is: 
(R2) What is the relationship between the effects of different property taxes and differ-
ent income taxes? 
Whether tax-induced migration is a serious constraint on tax revenue will depend on the size 
of the spatial units and the distribution of the population relative to borders. The recent exten-
sion of limited income taxation powers to the devolved government of Wales (with 2014 Act) 
certainly creates a possibility of tax-induced migration. About half the population of Wales 
lives within 25 miles of the border with England and on the other side there are four and a half 
million residents within 25 miles. Wales is highly integrated with the much larger English 
economy in both geographic and economic senses. Annual migration both in and out of the 
Welsh economy to the rest of the U.K. is around 50,000 for a population of about three million. 
Daily commuters into England number more than 80,000 (6% of the workforce) with about 
half the number commuting in the opposite direction (Turner 2014). There is a small and vari-
able balance of immigration from England. 
Three types of tax revenue effects from increasing an income tax rate have been distinguished: 
‘mechanical’, ‘behavioural’ and ‘migration’ impacts (Holtham, 2010, chapter 6). The ‘mechan-
ical’ effect involves simply multiplying, say, a higher tax rate by the tax base–the incomes of 
the taxpayers. The ‘behavioural’ effect is intended to capture changes in the supply of effort, 
influenced by the marginal tax rate. For this effect the key coefficient is the elasticity of re-
ported taxpayer income to one minus the marginal tax rate (Brewer, Saez and Shephard, 2010). 
If effort and therefore earnings are diminished by a higher marginal tax rate, then the coefficient 
is positive. Because the tax base then falls there is an offset to the extra revenue generated by 
the ‘mechanical effect’. 
HMRC (2012) include migration effects with the behavioural effect and observe that interna-
tional labour mobility increased in recent years, as both legal barriers and general migration 
costs were reduced. Their analysis of the revenue yield of the rise in the U.K. tax rate from 40 
to 50% (HMRC, 2012, Box 3.1) concluded that possibly the behavioural effect was so large 
that it more than offset the mechanical effect, and tax receipts fell.  
A contribution of this paper is to elicit an additional ‘economic effect’ of income tax divergence, 
in addition to the foregoing three effects. The income tax difference results in a new equilib-
rium of the economy, in which all the endogenous economic variables (such as consumption 
output and all tax revenue) will have changed. 
The existing devolved property tax, ‘council tax’, is levied upon domestic housing (and, as 
‘business rates’, upon commercial property) and is specific to each LA. The present exercise 
distinguishes three income types of individual corresponding to the three rates of income tax6; 
they are Basic Rate (BR) taxpayers (20% @£10,600~£42,385), Higher Rate (HR) taxpayers 
(40% @£42,385~£150,000) and Additional Rate (AR) taxpayers (45% @£150,000+). The dif-
ferent types also face different National Insurance (NI, social security tax) rates (Appendix B). 
Each type is assumed to live in houses of markedly different value and hence to pay a different 
LA property tax rate. Their behaviour will diverge in willingness to relocate in response to tax 
rate differentials between places. This has potentially diverse consequences for tax revenue 
changes if any of the three income tax rates alters.  
Higher LA property taxes tend to reduce house prices (as residence-based local income taxes 
would) and in some instances greater LA spending may raise them (Rosenthal, 1999; Cheshire 
and Sheppard, 2003). House prices (and therefore rents) will reflect a market average of pref-
erences for what is provided by the LA and for what must be paid for them in taxation. In 
practice LA taxation is redistributive. Some residents gain, and some lose. The goods and ser-
vices supplied are not pure public goods, contrary to the Tiebout model. A local government 
may tax and spend on state education but persons with no children or who send children to 
private schools will not benefit from this category of expenditure and would gain materially 
from being in a jurisdiction that allocated less to education and consequently taxes less. House 
price differentials in response to taxation will not eliminate tax-induced migration. Given the 
heterogeneity of the population, some migration response to differences in local tax rates may 
still be found–as for Canadian property tax-induced inter-municipal migration (Islam and 
Rafiquzzaman, 1991).  
3. The Devolved Economy Model 
The devolved economy computable general equilibrium (CGE) model is the simplest possible 
that can focus on the effects of migration induced by income tax differentials for the whole of 
Wales7. The model uses country level data (England and Wales, aggregated over the 348 local 
authority areas). Tax rates and wages are exogenous and tax revenues, housing and consumer 
expenditure and output, are endogenous. Migration becomes endogenous when the economet-
ric model of tax-induced migration supplements the CGE model. 
                                                          
6 To keep the modelling manageable, we do not distinguish between households and individuals. In 2012, 55% 
of all taxpayers’ income in Wales was earned by individuals earning less than £30,000 a year and less than 6% 
of the taxable income in Wales was earned by those earning £100,000 and above (Poole et al, 2016). 
7 This model does not consider tax-induced changes in the supply of effort or tax effects on savings and invest-
ments because these can be controversial. The simplicity of the model allows us to conclude that quantitatively 
the effects will be understated or downward biased.  
The demand side of the model consists of the three types (𝑖 = 1, 2, 3) of individuals in terms 
of wages (and income tax rates), while the supply side is simplified to only one sector. The 
composite product can be used for private goods or ‘public’ goods provided by both central 
and local governments. An important contributor to individual wellbeing or utility is housing, 
or accommodation, which is part of the composite product.  
Some of the model’s structural parameters have real counterparts, such as tax rates, which can 
be imposed. Other parameters, such as the elasticity of substitutions in utility functions and 
production functions, merely must lie in some plausible range (see Appendix B). Where nec-
essary the structural parameters are estimated so that the total (squared) gap between the sim-
ulated variables (model) and the observed variables (data) is minimised in the status quo. In 
the present case, since the number of observables is just equal to the number of unknown struc-
tural parameters (see Appendix B), the identification condition is satisfied.  
The Household 
All individuals are assumed liable for the property (council) tax. The different rates of council 
tax for the three types of individual are calculated by estimating the average house price of 
each type and allocating the payments appropriately. Effective council tax rates are then cal-
culated from the weighted average of council taxes divided by the corresponding house prices, 
with the weights being the shares of properties in each council tax band8.  
Only the lower income (type 1) individuals are assumed to face the uncertainty of unemploy-
ment and the possibility of inactivity in the labour market, because of low skills or disability. 
They are also the main beneficiaries of the income redistribution such as unemployment bene-
fits. The model for all three types is detailed in Appendix B. 
For all the three types, their after-tax income (or wage) is calculated with the then current rates 
of income tax and NI contribution. The consumption VAT tax rate is assumed to be the same 
for all individuals9. Private consumption is assumed to consist of other consumption and hous-
ing, while the ‘public’ goods are assumed to be the same across all three types of residences. 
The Producer 
The supply side of the economy consists of one production sector with one composite output, 
which can be used for either private or ‘public’ goods. Firms pay a corporation tax and the 
                                                          
8 This detailed calculation is possible because an extended Monte Carlo method is employed to simulate the 
property prices in the previous step, allowing the calculation of the average property prices for each band (Ap-
pendix C). 
9 Although the model allows that the proportion of income paid by lower income groups in VAT is lower than 
for higher groups. 
corporate NI contributions. Exogenous/fixed investment is assumed absorbed by the total fac-
tor productivity. The labour market is assumed segmented to reflect the different skills of work-
ers.  
Devolved Government  
Total tax revenue levied in the devolved economy consists of LA and national tax revenue. In 
practice, the latter is collected by the U.K. central government and then an adjusted sum is 
transferred back to the devolved government of Wales in the form of a block grant. After tax 
devolution, the devolved government is assigned some of the tax revenue (mainly from income 
tax) and the remaining transfer from the central government is reduced accordingly. The 2014 
Act allows the devolved government to lower all, or any, of the three income tax bands by up 
to 10p in the pound but there is no upper limit. Tax liability is based on residence and only 
applies to non-savings and non-dividend income. 
When devolved tax rates are set above central government rates, an estimate is made of the 
additional revenue (‘mechanical effect’) that this would raise from Welsh taxpayers and the 
sum is added to the devolved revenues. Conversely, a decision to lower rates relative to the rest 
of the U.K. reduces the estimated Welsh tax take (‘mechanical effect’) and central government 
cuts Welsh government revenue by that amount10. Central government spending, which ac-
counts for about half of government expenditure in Wales, and the block grant, are exogenous. 
In addition to income tax, the model explicitly includes all the principal sources of tax revenue: 
National Insurance contributions (a labour tax, paid by both employees and employers), VAT, 
council tax and corporation tax.  
The Relationship between Council (Property) Tax and Income Tax 
The effect of an income tax difference is simulated by translating it into a council tax difference. 
Council tax alters the relative prices of housing and all other goods. An equivalent income 
effect, or income tax, to the change in the council tax can be calculated by assuming an ‘indif-
ference curve’ between housing and all other goods along which taxpayers have the same util-
ity11. The two taxes affect taxpayers’ budgets differently–council tax raises the relative price 
of housing whereas income tax does not. The income tax equivalent of a council tax difference 
corrects for the different budget gradients while maintaining the same level of utility. The CGE 
model is used to simulate these two situations. 
                                                          
10 The legislation recognizes that if the Welsh government sets a different rate of income tax there may be be-
havioural spillover that, if agreed by both governments, could warrant compensatory payments.  
11 Rather than the ‘compensation’ income to restore the original utility. That is, the Equivalent Variation must be 
found rather than the Compensating Variation. 
4. The Migration Model 
To parameterise the migration equation of the CGE model unbiassed estimates of the response 
to LA property tax differences are required12. These are obtained from estimating a migration 
gravity specification that Anderson (2011) derives from microeconomic foundations, analo-
gous to the trade gravity models (Anderson and Wincoop, 2003). The gross migrant flow de-
pends first on the pattern of a ‘frictionless’ world. Here migrants from an origin would be found 
in equal proportions to their share of the population in all destinations. The additional element 
represents the effect of bilateral ‘frictions’ that reduce migration, such as travel and information 
costs that increase with distance between origin and destination, and tax differentials between 
origin and destination. 
Following Ortega and Peri (2013) we control for the multilateral resistance to migration that is 
induced by heterogeneity in the preferences for type 2 and type 3 migration because of their 
skills. This empirically corresponds to estimating these gravity equations with LA origin dum-
mies. Type 1 migrants in the CGE model, unlike types 2 and 3, are vulnerable to unemployment, 
they have lower skills and wages. Their destinations can be more problematic because of the 
availability and price of more affordable housing. Hence their controls are LA destination dum-
mies.  
The CGE net migration model allows the comparison of two static equilibria before and after 
a tax change. It does not allow any conclusion about how long the equilibrating process takes. 
For consistency in the gravity migration specification a tax change or differential will recon-
figure equilibrium population until net flows, but not gross flows, between all localities are 
zero. When 𝑚𝑖𝑗 is gross migration from 𝑖 to 𝑗 and 𝑁 the number of localities, the equilibrium 
condition is:  
∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1 = ∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1  …(1) 
Other key features of the gravity equation specification are that bilateral gross migration flows 
from an origin to a destination location are divided by the ‘masses’ of the destination and origin 
locations (i.e. populations) and negatively related to the ‘distance’. This avoids the problem of 
reverse causation bias in the regression that for instance Mitze and Schmitz’s (2015), Danish 
municipality migration study address using lagged regressors13. However, their dependent var-
iable is net in-migration to a region from all other regions in aggregate, by skill group. While 
the present study similarly considers separate (income tax) categories of migrants, we accept 
Stilwell’s (2005) point in his migration modelling survey that it is preferable to allocate mi-
                                                          
12 A recent example studying internal migration is Stillwell et al (2016), who use census data. The NHS based 
data used here is for a more recent year, 2015, instead of 2011. 
13 Their partial adjustment formulation would not be consistent with our CGE model. 
grants from each origin to each destination because there are frequently important links be-
tween certain origin and destination pairs. The static spatial structure is further controlled by 
whether the origin and the destination LAs belong to the same region. 
To analyse the effects on the three income types of taxpayers, the distribution of income tax at 
regional level is utilised to estimate the shares of each household type in each migration flow 
at LA level. Where subscripts 𝑜 and 𝑑 indicate respectively origin and destination, if there are 
𝑚𝑜𝑑 migrating from LA 𝑜 to LA 𝑑, and there is information on the distribution of income tax 
for the region to which a LA belongs, then this distribution can be used to calculate the shares 
of the three types of individuals (𝑘 = 1,2,3) in 𝑚𝑜𝑑 to obtain 𝑚𝑜𝑑
𝑘 . 
The effects of council tax differences on migration are found from the estimated equation (2), 
𝑚𝑜𝑑
𝑘
𝑃𝑜×𝑃𝑑
= 𝑓 (𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑙 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑑−𝑜 , ln(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) , 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 , 𝐿𝐴 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠) …(2) 
Relative taxation in equation (2) is not the jurisdictions’ council (property) tax rates but an 
estimate of the tax paid by each taxpayer type as a proportion of their average house price. 
Reinforcing earlier assessments of endogeneity, tax differentials are unlikely to be caused by 
(as well as, or instead of, a cause of) migration because of central government financial equal-
isation. The Rate Support Grant (including Business Rates and specific grants) that accounted 
for three quarters of LA revenues in 2014 was allocated on a needs basis and was intended to 
prevent that.  
Between about half the pairs of the 348 LAs in England and Wales there was no migration in 
201414. The distribution is therefore heavily weighted towards zero unlike the normal distribu-
tion. This makes Poisson regression appropriate, with the over-dispersion bias controlled by 
robust standard errors (Winkelmann and Zimmermann, 1992; Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 
2011)15.   
Table 1 presents the separate estimates of the Poisson gravity migration model for the three 
types of individuals. The coefficients may be interpreted as elasticities16. The key findings are 
that a higher council tax rate differential (destination minus origin) between destination and 
origin results in a lower immigration flow. The ordering of the coefficients from smallest for 
the lowest income group (type 1) to the highest for type 3 taxpayers is consistent with expec-
tations from the sums at stake. Young adults were most likely migrants, with the biggest single 
peak (those aged 19) reflecting moves to start higher education (ONS, 2014). Students are not 
                                                          
14 The migration flows are based on the changes of NHS registrations within the U.K. Migration originating or 
ending outside England and Wales is not taken into consideration. 
15 Chen (2016) adopts a Heckman selection model to address the same problem in a migration gravity model. 
16  Broadly comparable to Agrawal and Foremny’s (2018, p26) high income mover and stayers’ elasticity of 
0.08 and Akcigit et al. (2016) ‘s 0.03. 
liable for council tax but are included in the migration data. This accounts for the statistical 
insignificance of the distance variable for type 1s. It may also boost the standard error of the 
tax coefficient for type 1 migrant flows and contribute to a small response to the tax differential 
for these people. 
Table 1 Migration and Property Tax Rate Poisson Estimation Results 
Regressor Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
property tax rate differential  -0.0117*** -0.0199*** -0.0290*** 
ln(distance)  0.0462 -1.7349*** -1.7365*** 
within the same region 1.9134*** 0.5181*** 0.4540*** 
intercept -2.0606*** 4.2948*** 2.1487*** 
No. of obs. 120756 120756 120756 
log-likelihood of the model -142827 -36210 -10986 
log-likelihood of the null -233835 -70820 -17935 
pseudo R2 0.389198 0.488704 0.387455 
Notes: *** indicates statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. LA dummies are omitted. The for-
mula for calculating Pseudo R2 is: 1-ll/ll_0, where ll is log-likelihood of the model and ll_0 is log-likelihood of 
the null hypothesis (i.e. a model with constant only). 
The property tax effect directly estimated from the gravity model above must be translated into 
the effect of the income tax differences with the help of the CGE model; that is, to answer the 
research sub-question (R2). The next section is devoted to the specification, calibration and 
simulation of such a structural model. 
5. Tax-Induced Migration 
To measure the counterfactual effects on migration flows to Wales of tax rates differentials, 
the effect for each LA is directly estimated and the individual impacts summed17. The net flow 
of migrants is the sum of bilateral gross flows between LAs in Wales and in England–ignoring 
flows between LAs in the same country. In this manner any asymmetry in the magnitudes of 
the two countries’ population is accounted for during the aggregation of LAs. The near sym-
metry of responses to cuts and increases in tax rates is explained by the specification of the 
migration equation and the distribution of population along the border. The most substantial 
concentration of money and income in England is in London and the South East of England, a 
considerable distance from the border. The migration equations show that type 2 and type3 
                                                          
17 The migration effect is calculated using the predicted/fitted values of the Poisson regression for new property 
tax rates, which reflect the equivalent effects of a given income tax change. For all pairs involving Welsh LAs, 
the values of the tax differential are adjusted, while keeping unchanged those only involving English LAs. The 
total migration effect for Wales is then found by aggregating across Welsh LAs with the relevant within Wales 
intra-LA effects excluded. This approach was checked against the alternative of estimating an average marginal 
effect for all the LAs in Wales and then multiplying it by the number of LAs to obtain the aggregate effect on 
Wales. The two methods give very similar results. 
flows are lower between distant LA pairs; for much of the large English population, Wales is 
too far away to enter locational calculations. 
Figure 1 The Effects of Changes in Income Tax Rates on Migration 
 
Notes: The panels show the relationships between changes in income tax rates (horizontal axes) and changes in 
migration flows into Wales (vertical axes). 
A change in BR (Basic Rate of income tax, 20%) affects all three types of individuals, a change 
in HR (Higher Rate of income tax, 40%) will affect types 2 and 3, and AR (Additional Rate of 
income tax, 45%) only affects type 3. By contrast, the effect of council tax is selective and 
exclusive to each type; for instance, a specific property tax only affects type 1 individuals and 
similarly for type 2 and type 3 taxpayers. Therefore, to obtain the equivalent effect of a change 
in income tax, all three property (council) tax rates must be utilised. 
Sensitivity of migration depends on which taxable income component is the greater part of 
total income for the taxpayer type. But movement volumes also depend on the number in the 
taxpayer category. So, the number of type 1 taxpayers (by far the largest group18) is most sen-
sitive to a change in BR; a 1p increase in income tax triggers an eventual total out-migration 
of just under 6000 (panel A figure 1) but this is a very small proportion of type 1 taxpayers. By 
contrast only a little over 2000 of the wealthier type 2 eventually move out (Panel A figure 1) 
but type 2 are a much smaller group so their proportionate response is stronger. The richest 
                                                          
18 We estimate type 1 taxpayers at 1.2854 million, type 2 at 0.144 million and type 3 at 5000. 
(type 3) are not very responsive to differences in the BR, because most of their income is not 
in the lowest tax bracket (and there are very few AR taxpayers). 
Differences in the HR of tax have a marked effect on HR taxpayers (type 2) (Figure 1 Panel 
B); just under 2000 eventually relocate in response to a 1p rise. But the proportionate effect is   
stronger for type 3 (AR) taxpayers for whom under 1000 move. Almost £110,000 of their in-
come (=£150,000-£42,385) would be subject to a different tax rate if the HR changed. They 
must have an income over one quarter of a million pounds to be similarly affected by a com-
parable AR change. As panel C Figure 1 shows, only a small number of (exclusively type 3) 
taxpayers move in or out in response to AR rate changes. 
6. Impact of Devolved Tax Differentials on Tax Revenue and Output per Capita 
The CGE model equations are re-solved after re-setting income tax rates ranging from 5p in 
the pound lower than the prevailing rates to 5p higher. The implied changes in migration are 
simulated using the gravity model with the help of the relationship between income and council 
tax rates indicated by the CGE model. Because Wales is a small open economy (the population 
of England is about eighteen time larger than Wales’) and to keep the exercise reasonably sim-
ple, wage levels are fixed for all three types of individuals; their wages are ultimately set by 
migration and trade with the wide world. Local policies, such as tax, determine long run equi-
librium population and the migration necessary to achieve it. 
Net immigration to the decentralised economy raises private and/or government production, 
depending on the distribution between activities. The allocation ultimately is governed by 
household demand. By changing the tax bases, migration also influences all tax yields of cen-
tral and local government, as well as devolved income tax yield. Here originate possible diver-
gences of interest between central and devolved governments. 
With the extent of the income tax devolution permitted, the offsetting migration responses from 
BR changes are small proportionately (Figure 2). The devolved government’s income tax rev-
enue is a percentage of total jurisdiction income tax revenue, so the total follows the same 
pattern as the devolved revenue. The ‘mechanical effect’ entirely dominates. In the status quo 
total tax revenue generated in Wales is £20.14 bn, income tax generated in Wales is £4.88 bn 
and income tax kept in Wales is £1.96 bn. Therefore, in Figure 2, if BR rises by 5p, income tax 
generated in Wales will rise by 8.02% (i.e. from £4.88 bn to £5.27 bn, about 2 percentage points 
less than the mechanical effect)19. Income tax kept by Wales will rise by 30% (from £1.96 bn 
                                                          
19 Compared with the mechanical effect of 10.44% and the migration effect of -2.42%. The income tax revenue 
is defined as: 𝐼𝑇 ≡ (𝑤1 − 𝜅𝐼𝑇1) × 𝜏𝐼𝑇1 × 𝐿1 × (1 − 𝑢) + [(𝜅𝐼𝑇2 − 𝜅𝐼𝑇1) × 𝜏𝐼𝑇1 + (𝑤2 − 𝜅𝐼𝑇2) × 𝜏𝐼𝑇2] × 𝐿2 +
[(𝜅𝐼𝑇2 − 𝜅𝐼𝑇1) × 𝜏𝐼𝑇1 + (𝜅𝐼𝑇3 − 𝜅𝐼𝑇2) × 𝜏𝐼𝑇2 + (𝑤3 − 𝜅𝐼𝑇3) × 𝜏𝐼𝑇3] × 𝐿3, where numerical subscripts indicate 
taxpayer type, 𝑤 wages, 𝜅𝐼𝑇 is tax free income component, 𝜏𝐼𝑇 is the income tax rate, 𝑢 unemployment rate and 
𝐿 number of taxpayers. Using the total differentiation formula:  
to £2.55 bn), but total tax revenue generated in Wales drops by 1.9% (from £20.14 bn to £19.76 
bn). For income tax, the mechanical effect dominates migration effect, while for total tax rev-
enue, migration effect dominates because the change in population also affects all the other tax 
revenues generated in Wales. 
For HR changes, the asymmetric pattern between income tax generated in, and kept by, Wales 
occurs because the mechanical effect for devolved income tax is greater than the migration 
effect; the contribution share of tax change is greater for devolved income tax than for total 
income tax generated in Wales. Increases or decreases in the AR appear to have minimal effect 
on tax revenue because behavioural responses exactly offset mechanical effects (Figure 2). 
Figure 2 Revenue and Productivity Effects of Changes in Income Tax Rates  
 
Notes: Panel A, 100 = £4.88 billion; Panel B, 100 = £20.14 billion; Panel C, 100 = £1.96 billion; Panel D: 100 = 
£37,881. 
The response of GVA per worker in the jurisdiction is substantially different (Panel D). Tax-
induced migration alters the proportions of taxpayer types in the population and, since they 
have different productivities, average productivity of the economy responds to tax changes (see 
                                                          
𝛥𝐼𝑇 =
𝜕𝐼𝑇
𝜕𝜏𝐼𝑇𝑘
Δ𝜏𝐼𝑇𝑘 + ∑
𝜕𝐼𝑇
𝜕𝐿𝑘
𝜕𝐿𝑘
𝜕𝜏𝐼𝑇𝑘
Δ𝜏𝐼𝑇𝑘
3
𝑘=1 , where 𝑘 = 1,2,3. 
For example, under fixed wages, if there is a change in BR (𝜏𝐼𝑇1), then there are two simultaneous effects: a me-
chanical effect: the first term directly due to the rise in 𝜏𝐼𝑇1, and a migration effect: the second term indirectly 
due to the drop in 𝐿1. 
Appendix). A BR rate increase affects all taxpayers; the proportional effect is greater on (higher 
productivity) type 2s than type 1s.  
Panel B shows that the consequences for total tax revenue–not surprisingly–are very similar to 
those for output per worker. Since the central government bears the loss of total tax revenue 
from a BR or HR tax rise in this case, while decentralised government revenue increases, there 
is a divergence of interests between the two tiers of government in setting the HR and BR of 
devolved income tax. Tax-induced migration has a muted effect on devolved government rev-
enues in this scenario because such a small proportion of revenue is decentralised. The ‘exter-
nality’ effects on the tax revenue generated by the devolved economy are greater, but devolved 
government revenues are largely insulated from them. 
In principle this divergence might be resolved by full tax decentralisation, but other consider-
ations are likely to militate against such a solution. They include the devolved revenue conse-
quences of possible adverse asymmetric shocks that the central government wishes to alleviate. 
Instead of creating tax differentials, the efficiency objective of tax devolution would be 
achieved if the decentralised jurisdiction devoted policy to expanding the tax base.  
As a robustness test of the model we simulated the model with an elasticity of substitution in 
consumption lower and higher than our estimated value by 10 percent (Appendix D). The rev-
enues were within 2 percent of our best estimates except for HR changes, where increases of 
more than 2p could not be computed. 
7. Conclusion 
Given tax autonomy, decentralised governments may want to change the structure as well as 
the rates of their taxes. To predict possible outcomes, this paper has described and implemented 
a novel approach to estimating the fiscal consequences of possible tax rates set by devolved 
governments before they have exercised their policy freedom (and thus where no direct empir-
ical evaluation is possible). The approach provides an indication of how important induced 
migration might be.  
The method developed in this paper can be employed for different sub-national taxes from 
those considered here. For example, the migration effects of a LA sales tax might be aggregated 
into larger devolved government units to infer the migration impact of an income or property 
tax at the higher level of government. Even though extrapolation beyond the range of variation 
of the smaller sub-national tax may be hazardous the proposed method is likely to be the most 
reliable available approach to projecting tax yields when future tax rates diverge. 
The tax revenue results here are a lower bound on responsiveness to income tax rates because 
no allowance has been made for possible tax-induced changes in the supply of effort or in tax 
evasion and avoidance. The general conclusion is that the ‘behavioural (including migration) 
response’ to Welsh Higher Rate income tax changes will eventually offset the ‘mechanical 
effect’ for devolved government revenue. But an important caveat is that the present modelling 
does not permit a judgement about how long the return to equilibrium would take. 
The extent of fiscally-induced migration will always depend upon the distribution of population 
relative to jurisdiction borders. Also, for taxpayers to be responsive, large enough sums must 
be at stake. Hence higher income taxpayers are more likely to move. Such earners will gener-
ally create more employment and output; their migration will have a larger impact than their 
numbers at first sight might suggest. Changes in devolved tax rates therefore may in some 
circumstances yield considerably more or less tax revenue than ‘mechanical’ estimates indicate. 
The potential mobility of the tax base may incentivise devolved economies to enhance the base 
directly rather than to alter higher income tax rates. In any event the possibility that the ‘mi-
gration effect’ dominates the ‘mechanical effect’ ensures that tax devolution looks less attrac-
tive to a decentralised government than simply delegated expenditure.  
Limited or partial tax devolution dampens the fiscal impact of induced migration, or any tax 
base change, on the devolved government revenue. The consequences of devolved tax and tax 
base alterations in this instance are also felt by the central government revenues and the de-
volved economy. The incentives given to the devolved government to ignore these spill-over 
effects when choosing tax rates and policy are not efficient. But the risk of adverse tax revenue 
shocks restricted to the decentralised jurisdiction may still provide a rationale for central gov-
ernment not granting complete tax devolution. 
 
Acknowledgements 
The authors thank the participants in the RSA regional meeting in Cardiff November 2016, the 
Cardiff-Xiamen-Newcastle Conference (Cardiff, 28/06/2016), and the Behavioural Insights for 
Taxation Workshop (Manchester, 28/10/2016) and anonymous referees for their comments on 
earlier versions but remaining errors and omissions are ours alone. We are also grateful for  
financial support from Peril Capital and the Ministry of Education, China (Grant No. 
19YJA790089) 
 
 
References 
Agrawal, D R and Foremny, D, (2018) Relocation of the Rich: Migration in Response to Top 
Tax Rate Changes from Spanish Reforms. 
Akcigit, U., Baslandze, S. and Stantcheva, S. (2016). `Taxation and the international 
mobility of inventors', American Economic Review, vol. 106(10), pp. 2930-2981. 
Anderson, J. (2011) The Gravity Model, Annual Review of Economics 3:133-160  
Anderson, J. and van Wincoop, E (2003) ‘Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the Border 
Puzzle’, American Economic Review 93(1):170–192 
Brewer, M, Saez E and Shephard A (2010). Means-testing and Tax Rates on Earnings. In The 
Mirrlees Review: Reforming the Tax System for the 21st Century, Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
Chen, Y (2016) Fiscal Decentralization, Rural Industrialization and Undocumented Labour 
Mobility in Rural China, 1982–87, Regional Studies. 50(9):1469-1482 
Cheshire, P and Sheppard, S (2003) Capitalised in the housing market or how we pay for free 
schools: The impact of supply constraints and uncertainty, Paper presented at the Royal Geo-
graphical Society Meeting. 
Day, K (1992) Interprovincial migration and local public goods, Canadian Journal of Econom-
ics 25(1):123-144 
Foreman-Peck, J and Lungu, L (2009) Fiscal Devolution and Dependency, Applied Economics 
41:815-828 
Fox, W, Herzog, H and Schlottman A (1989) Metropolitan Fiscal Structure and Migration, 
Journal of Regional Science 29(4):523-536 
Gil-Serrate, R, López-Laborda J and Mur J (2011) Revenue Autonomy and Regional Growth: 
An Analysis of the 25-Year Process of Fiscal Decentralisation in Spain, Environment and Plan-
ning A 43:2626-2648, 
Gillespie G, McGregor P, Swales J, Ping Y, (2001) The displacement and multiplier effects of 
regional selective assistance. A computable general equilibrium analysis, Regional Studies 
35(2):125-139 
Hatfield, J (2015) Federalism, taxation, and economic growth Journal of Urban Economics 
87:114-125  
Hatfield, J and Kosec, K (2013) Federal competition and economic growth, Journal of Public 
Economics, 97:144-159. 
HMRC (2012) The Exchequer effect of the 50 per cent additional rate of income tax 
Holtham Report: Independent Commission on Funding & Finance for Wales (2010). Fairness 
and accountability: a new funding settlement for Wales. 
Islam, M and Rafiquzzaman, M. (1991) Property tax and inter-municipal migration in Canada: 
a multivariate test of the Tiebout hypothesis. Applied Economics. 23(4A):623-30. 
Journard, I. and Kongsrud, P. (2003) Fiscal relations across government levels, OECD Eco-
nomic Studies, 36(1) 156-229 
Kleven, H, Landais, C, Saez, E, and Schultz E (2014) Migration and wage effects of taxing top 
earners: evidence from the foreigners’ tax scheme in Denmark, Quarterly Journal of Econom-
ics 333–378 
Liebig, T, Puhani, P and Souza-Poza, A (2007) Taxation and Internal Migration- Evidence 
from the Swiss Census using Community level variation in Income tax rates, Journal of Re-
gional Science 47:807–836, 
Liebig, T and Sousa-Poza, A (2006) The influence of taxes on migration: evidence from Swit-
zerland Cambridge Journal of Economics, 30:235-252 
Meghir, C and Phillips, D (2010) ‘Labour Supply and Taxes’ Mirrlees Review: Reforming the 
Tax System for the 21st Century, Institute for Fiscal Studies.  
Mitze, T. and Schmidt, T. D.  (2015) Internal Migration, Regional Labor Markets and the Role 
of Agglomeration Economies, Annals of Regional Science 55:61–101 
Moretti, E and Wilson, D.J. (2017) The Effect of State Taxes on the Geographical Location of 
Top Earners: Evidence from Star Scientists, American Economic Review, 107(7):1858–1903  
Nelson, P (2008) Life-Course Influences on Nonearnings Income Migration in the United 
States, Environment and Planning A 40(9):2149-2168 
Oates, W (1972) Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt. 
ONS (2014) Internal and international migration for the United Kingdom in the year prior to 
the 2011 Census. 
Ortega F and Peri G (2013) The Role of Income and Immigration Policies in Attracting Inter-
national Migrants, Migration Studies, 1(1), 47-74. 
Poole E G, Ifan, G. and Wyn Jones, R (2016) Income Tax and Wales: The Risks and Rewards 
of New Model Devolution, Wales Governance Centre, Cardiff University 
Rodriguez-Pose, A and Gill, N (2005) On the ‘economic dividend’ of devolution, Regional 
Studies 39:405–420 
Rodriguez-Pose, A and Ezcurra, R (2010) Does decentralization matter for regional disparities? 
A cross-country analysis, Journal of Economic Geography 10(5):619-644 
Rodriguez-Pose, A, Tijmstra, S and Bwire, A (2009) Fiscal Decentralisation, Efficiency, and 
Growth, Environment and Planning A 41(9):2041-2062 
Rosenthal, L (1999) House Prices and Local Taxes in the U.K., Fiscal Studies 20(1) 61–76. 
doi: 10.1111/j.1475-5890.1999.tb00004.x  
Rutherford, T and Törmä, H (2010) Efficiency of Fiscal Measures in Preventing Out-migration 
from North Finland, Regional Studies, 44(4):465-475. 
Saez, E, Slemrod, J and Giertz, S (2012). The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to 
Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review. Journal of Economic Literature, 50(1):3–50. 
Sanguinetti, P and Tommasi, M (2004) Intergovernmental transfers and fiscal behaviour: in-
surance versus aggregate discipline, Journal of International Economics, 62:149–70. 
Santos Silva J. M. C., and Tenreyro S (2011) Further simulation evidence on the performance 
of the Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood estimator," Economics Letters, 112(2), 220-222. 
Stillwell, J. (2005) Inter-regional Migration Modelling - a Review and Assessment, 45th Con-
gress of the European Regional Science Association: "Land Use and Water Management in a 
Sustainable Network Society", 23-27 August 2005, Amsterdam, The Netherlands  
Stillwell, J, Bell, M, Ueffing, P, Daras, K, Charles-Edwards, E, Kupiszewski, M and 
Kupiszewska, D (2016) Internal migration around the world: comparing distance travelled and 
its frictional effect, Environment and Planning A 48(8):1657–1675 
Tiebout, R (1956) A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, Journal of Political Economy 
64(5):416-424 
Turner R (2014) Number of People Commuting out of Wales for Work hits Record High Wales 
on line, 26 Dec 
Winkelmann R and Zimmermann K F (1992) Robust poisson regression, Proceedings of the 
GLIM92 Conference and the 7th International Workshop on Statistical Modelling, Munich, 
13–17 July, 201-206 
Xu, Y and Warner, M (2016) Does devolution crowd out development? A spatial analysis of 
US local government fiscal effort, Environment and Planning A 48:5871-890 
Yilmazkuday, H (2017) Individual tax rates and regional tax revenues: a cross-state analysis. 
Regional Studies 51(5):701-711. 
Young C , Varner,C,  Lurie I Z and Prisinzano R. (2016) Millionaire migration and Taxation 
of the Elite-Evidence from Administrative Data, American Sociological Review, 81(3) 421–
446 
 
21 
 
Appendix A: The Data Sources 
We have used the following data sources in this study:  
(a) HMRC (2015). A disaggregation of HMRC tax receipts between England, Wales, 
Scotland & Northern Ireland: Methodology Note.  
(b) HMRC (2014). Income tax liabilities statistics: number of individual income taxpayers 
by region (Table 2.2) and share of total income for percentile groups (Table 2.4).  
(c) Department for Communities and Local Government (2015). Band D council tax 
for LA’s.  
(d) Department for Communities and Local Government (2011). Number of all charge-
able dwellings.  
(e) ONS (2016). Geometric centroid for each LA from GIS.  
(f) ONS (2015). Regional accounts: gross value added (GVA) measure, Welsh economic 
region and year.  
(g) ONS (2014).House price statistics for small areas: median sale price by dwelling type 
and LA.  
(h) ONS (2014). Labour market statistics: population, employment, unemployment, inac-
tivity and job density.  
(i) ONS (2015, 2014). Migration statistics unit: internal migration between English and 
Welsh LAs. 
(j) ONS (2012).Small area income estimates: total household weekly income. 
(k) ONS (2011). Squared Euclidean distance matrix at LA level.  
(l) Stats Wales (2015).Number of all chargeable dwellings. 
(m) Welsh Government (2015).Council tax levels by billing authority and band. 
The data are used for two purposes: (A) calibration of the economic model, or/and (B) estima-
tion of the econometric model. There are three ways of using the data: first, direct use as one 
of the regressors in the econometric model; second, calibration of the parameters in the eco-
nomic model by matching the model-implied endogenous variables with the observed endog-
enous variables; third, as the basis to implement an Extended Monte Carlo (EMC) simulation 
procedure (detailed in Appendix C) to generate the data needed for the econometric or eco-
nomic models. The variables used in the analysis, the data sources and the techniques are sum-
marised in the following table. 
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Variable Source Purpose Technique 
Council tax distribution (d) (l) (B) EMC 
Council tax rates (c) (m) (A) (B) Derived 
Euclidean distance (k) (B) Direct use 
Geographic distance (e) (B) Pythagoras theorem 
Government spending (a) (A) Calibration 
House price (g) (B) EMC 
Inactivity (h) (A) (B) Calibration, Direct use 
Income tax distribution (b) (A) (B) Calibration, EMC 
Job density (h) (B) Direct use 
Migration flow (i) (A) (B) Direct use 
Output (f) (A) Calibration 
Population (h) (B) Direct use 
Tax revenue (a) (A) Calibration 
Unemployment (h) (A) (B) Calibration, Direct use 
Wage (j) (A) (B) EMC 
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Appendix B: The CGE Model of the Devolved Economy 
The Consumer 
There are three types (𝑖 = 1, 2, 3) of consumers/taxpayers and wage (𝑤𝑖 for pre-tax wage, 𝜔𝑖 
for after-tax wage). Everyone receives a lump-sum benefit (𝑏𝑓) from the government common 
to all types. Utility depends on the private goods (𝑧𝑖), composed of housing (ℎ𝑖) and other 
private consumption (𝑐𝑖), and public goods provided by the local governments (𝐺) such as 
education and healthcare. Note that the income redistribution, such as jobseeker’s allowance 
𝜔 for the unemployed (𝑢 is the unemployment rate relevant only to type 1 low-income con-
sumers), is paid directly by the central government, so it can be treated as exogenous. There 
are different types of tax rates (𝜏s) under different income thresholds (𝜅s), which are summa-
rised in Table A1 (as of 2014). 
Thresholds Income Bands 𝜔𝑖 Employee Rates Employer Rates 
𝜅 Lower Upper 𝜏𝐼𝑇 𝜏𝑁𝐼 𝜏𝑁𝐼𝐹 
 0 8,064 0% 0% 0% 
𝜅𝑁𝐼1 8,064 8,112 0% 12% 0% 
𝜅𝑁𝐼𝐹 8,112 10,600 0% 12% 13.80% 
𝜅𝐼𝑇1 10,600 42,385 20% 12% 13.80% 
𝜅𝑁𝐼2 = 𝜅𝐼𝑇2 42,385 150,000 40% 2% 13.80% 
𝜅𝐼𝑇3 150,000 ∞ 45% 2% 13.80% 
Table A1 Combined Bands for Income Tax Rates and NI Rates 
The maximisation problem of a low-income (type 1) consumer is: 
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Similarly, the maximisation problem of a middle-income (type 2) consumer is: 
( ) ( )
2
2 2 2
2 2
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1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2
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(H2.1) Budget Constraint: ( ) ( )2 2 2 2 21 1C H Hbf p c p h  + = + + +  
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(H2.2) Income: 
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And the maximisation problem of a top-income (type 3) consumer is: 
( ) ( )
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3
3 3 3
3 3
1 1 1
3 3 3 3 31
ss
ss ss ss
ss ss
z c h 
− − − 
= + − 
  
. 
The Producer 
There are three types of labour input 𝐿𝑖 corresponding with the three types of taxpayers, total 
factor productivity is 𝐴, and 𝑝 the output price. The representative producer’s maximisation 
problem is: 
( )( ) ( )
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3 3
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(F1) Production Function: ( ) ( ) ( )
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. 
The Government 
The budget constraint of the Welsh government is20: 
( )+H ITWales UKT T B G+ =  
The term in the brackets was the original block grant from Whitehall, which did not distinguish 
between the income tax kept in Wales (𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠) and the other part (𝐵𝑈𝐾) before the devolution. 
However, after the 2014 Act, the two items could be explicitly separated to allow for different 
                                                          
20 Under the Wales Act 2017 the Welsh government can borrow up to £1 billion from central government but 
this must be used only for capital expenditure which is not considered in this static model. 
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income tax rates in Wales. In the status quo, the Welsh government is entitled to 10p in the 
pound of the yield of Welsh income taxes, i.e. the Basic Rate, the Higher Rate and the Addi-
tional Rate. For example, the Higher Rate is currently 40p in the pound, so 10p in the pound is 
kept by Welsh government as part of 𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠. If they decide to raise the Higher Rate in Wales 
to 41p in the pound, then 11p in the pound will be kept.  
(G1) Council Tax Generated and Used in Wales:  
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3H H H H H H HT p h L p h L p h L  = + +  
(G2) Income Tax Kept in Wales:  
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(G3) Income Tax Generated in Wales:  
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(G4) National Insurance Contributions Generated in Wales:  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
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= − −
+ − + −  
+ − + −  
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(G5) Consumption VAT Tax Generated in Wales:  
( )1 1 2 2 3 3C C C CT p c L c L c L  = + +  
(G5) Corporation Tax Generated in Wales:  
F FT =  . 
The total tax revenue generated in Wales is 𝑇𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 = 𝑇𝐻 + 𝑇𝐼𝑇 + 𝑇𝑁𝐼 + 𝑇𝐶 + 𝑇𝐹 + 𝑇𝑂, 
where 𝑇𝑂 captures all other tax revenues. It only accounts for a little over 60% of the total 
government expenditure in Wales (including public goods, pension and welfare benefits). 
26 
 
The remaining expenditure is subsidised by English taxpayers, equivalent to a payment 
of almost £4000 to each person in Wales. We assume the UK government will fix the 
block grant, so 𝐺 can be endogenously derived from the budget constraint. 
Model Closure 
To solve the model, we need to provide model closure conditions and specify which variables 
are exogenous. Consumers and firms maximise their objective functions treating the following 
variables as exogenous: 𝑤𝑖, 𝐺, 𝐿𝑖 , 𝑢.  
• Wages (𝑤𝑖). Imposing the labour markets clearing conditions will determine wages 
(equivalent to equating wages from the consumers’ first order conditions (FOCs) and 
from the firms’ FOCs). 
• Government Expenditure on Public Goods (𝐺). The aggregate supply (𝑌) is demanded 
for consumption (of the three types of labour force and the pensioners 𝑃𝑆), investment 
(𝐼), or government expenditure on public goods (𝐺). The gap between the supply and 
demand in Wales is filled by 𝑁𝑇21, which is the net transfer from the rest of the UK. 
Pensioners’ consumption component 𝑃𝑆 is assumed to be fixed and investment  𝐼 is 
assumed to be fixed as a proportion of GDP.  Public goods (𝐺) are endogenously deter-
mined in the Welsh government’s budget constraint. Therefore, imposing the goods 
market clearing condition will determine the net transfer to Wales (𝑁𝑇) from the rest 
of the world.  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 1 2 3Y c h L c h L c h L P G L L TS NI L= + + + + + + + + +  + + . 
• Population (𝐿𝑖) depends on net immigration (𝑀𝑖) into Wales, 
i i iL L M= + , 
where ?̅?𝑖 is the original number of consumer type 𝑖 and 𝑀𝑖 is estimated using the econ-
ometric model.  
• Unemployment Rate (𝑢). This is exogenous because the economy is modelled in long 
run equilibrium with unemployment at its equilibrium rate 
• Goods Price (𝑝) and House Price (𝑝𝐻𝑖). Following CGE modelling convention, both are 
set to 1, so that the quantities can be interpreted as the expenditures22. Thus, 𝑐𝑖 is inter-
preted as the total expenditure on consumption and ℎ𝑖 is the total expenditure on hous-
ing. 
                                                          
21 𝑁𝑇 is not to be confused with 𝐵𝑈𝐾 . The latter is transferred to the Welsh government, so it balances the Welsh 
government’s budget constraint. While the former is transferred from the English good market to the Welsh 
goods market, and it balances aggregate supply and aggregate demand in the goods market in Wales. 
22 Housing (like consumption, investment and G) is a part of Y. There is only one “homogenous” output which 
can be used for all purposes (including housing). This output is also the numeraire goods for denominating the 
other price (real wage) in the model. 
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There are 27 competitive equilibrium conditions for the 30 endogenous variables: 𝑐1, ℎ1, 𝜔1,
𝑧1, 𝑢1, 𝑐2, ℎ2, 𝜔2, 𝑧2, 𝑢2, 𝑐3, ℎ3, 𝜔3, 𝑧3, 𝑢3, 𝑤1, 𝑤2, 𝑤3, Π, 𝑌, 𝐼, 𝑁𝑇, 𝑇𝐶 , 𝑇𝐻, 𝑇𝑁𝐼 , 𝑇𝐼𝑇 , 𝑇𝐹, 𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 , 
𝑇𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 and 𝐺. There are 12 exogenous variables: 𝐵𝑈𝐾, 𝑃𝑆, 𝑢, 𝐿1, 𝐿2, 𝐿3, ?̅?1, ?̅?2, ?̅?3, 𝑀1, 𝑀2 and 
𝑀3. Moreover, there are 11 parameters to be calibrated: 𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛽3, 𝑠𝑠1, 𝑠𝑠2, 𝑠𝑠3, 𝛾1, 𝛾2, 𝛾3, 𝜎 and 
𝐴. Note that other preference parameters, such as 𝛼1, 𝛼2, 𝛼3, 𝑠1, 𝑠2, 𝑠3, only exist to define un-
observable endogenous variables, so they cannot (and need not to) be estimated based on the 
data. They can, however, be set at some reasonable values for completeness, but they do not 
affect the analysis whatsoever. Policy parameters such as 𝜏s, 𝜅s, 𝑏𝑓 and 𝜔 are all known and 
set at their actual values. 
Using the technique of optimal calibration, the estimated structural parameters governing the 
behaviour of the consumers and firms are summarised in Table A2: 
Parameter Meaning Estimate 
𝛽1 Utility share of consumption (type 1) 0.950 
𝛽2 Utility share of consumption (type 2) 0.276 
𝛽3 Utility share of consumption (type 3) 0.519 
𝑠𝑠1 CES between consumption and housing (type 1) 0.236 
𝑠𝑠2 CES between consumption and housing (type 2) 0.363 
𝑠𝑠3 CES between consumption and housing (type 3) 1.678 
𝛾1 Income share of type 1 labour/individual 0.639 
𝛾2 Income share of type 2 labour/individual 0.329 
𝛾3 Income share of type 3 labour/individual 0.032 
𝜎 CES between the three types of labour 1.056 
𝐴 Total factor productivity 79.19 
Table A2 Estimated Structural Parameters using Optimal Calibration 
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Appendix C: Extended Monte Carlo Simulation 
The distribution of house price in Figure A1 is based on the 165,822 properties in England and 
Wales recorded by the Land Registry.  
 
Figure A1 Distribution of House Prices in England and Wales (2010) 
Note that we can use a gamma distribution to fit the house price data well, so the information 
contained in the observed distribution can be summarised by only two parameters parsimoni-
ously. The two parameters (𝑎, 𝑏) respectively characterise the shape (𝑎) and the scale (𝑏) of the 
gamma distribution. 
( )
( )
11 expa
a
X
gamma X X
b a b
−  = − 
  
 
To facilitate the econometric and economic modelling later, we design an Extended Monte 
Carlo simulation procedure to generate the house prices (𝑝𝐻1, 𝑝𝐻2, 𝑝𝐻3) for all three types of 
households.  
Step 1: Estimate the shape parameter. Based on the observed numbers of properties 
across council tax bands at LA level, we can imply the shape of the distribution of house 
prices – because house prices are strictly increasing with council tax bands. Therefore, 
the estimated shape parameter ?̂? of the distribution of council tax bands should be the 
same as that governing the shape of the gamma distribution of house prices.  
Step 2: Derive the scale parameter. Note that the estimated scale parameter ?̂?is not 
directly applicable to house prices because the horizontal axis of council tax bands are 
A, B, C, etc. while that of house price is pounds. But we can make use of the observed 
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median house prices in each LA and the relationship among median (𝑝𝐻), mean (?̅?𝐻) 
and the two parameters of gamma distribution to derive the corresponding scale param-
eter. 
 
3 0.8
1 3 0.2
3 0.2
3 0.8
H H
H
H H
a
p p a
a b p
a a
p E p ab
− 
= −
+  =  
−= = 
 
Step 3: Simulate the data. In this way, we estimate a unique distribution of house 
prices in each LA by a parsimonious parametric model (i.e. ?̂? and ?̂?), based on which, 
we can simulate 𝑁𝑆 = 10
5 observations of house prices. 
Step 4: Obtain the quantities of interest. With the simulated data, it is easy to obtain 
the mean/median house prices for the three types of households. For example, we know 
that the proportion of type 1 household is 89%, then we can use the first 89% simulated 
house prices (sorted) to calculate the mean/median house price of type 1 household. 
The Extended Monte Carlo procedure makes full use of the observed data before standard 
Monte Carlo simulation, so it has advantages of both bootstrapping and standard Monte Carlo 
re-sampling techniques. Similarly, this technique is applied to generating mean wages 
(𝑤1, 𝑤2, 𝑤3) of each household type in each LA. 
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Appendix D: Robustness of Conclusions 
 
Figure A2: Robustness Check when the Elasticity of Substitution (𝑠) Varies 
As a robustness test, we have simulated the model with 10% deviations in either di-
rection from the best estimate of the elasticity of substitution of the utility function. In 
the attached for the Appendix D, although the curvature in response to different rates 
of income tax differs, it can be seen that the qualitative conclusions are unchanged. 
With the two boundary elasticities, it is not possible to get an effect for HR beyond an 
increase of 2p. 
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Figure A3: Visualisation of the Production Function (the red dot: status quo) 
The figure represents the relation between taxpayer type shares and productivity.  The hori-
zontal axes are proportions of type 1 and type 2 and the vertical axis is the GVA per capita 
(in thousands). The red dot is the current position. If the share of type 2 is reduced by tax-in-
duced migration, the average GVA will drop because of the lower productivity (wages) of type 1 
taxpayers. 
 
 
